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CAREGIVERS AND TAX REFORM: BEFORE AND
AFTER SNAPSHOTS
Shannon Weeks McCormack*
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) changed the way families are taxed,
startingin tax year 2018. By rearranginga myriadof deck chairs,politicians
paintedrosy pictures offamilies reapingthe benefits of tax reform. In reality,

however, generalizations cannot be made, and the extent to which any one
family gains or loses depends on particularfacts. Even more obscured is the
way in which the TCJA changed - andfailed to change - the taxation of
different types of caregivers. This article seeks to provide needed clarity in
this area.
It begins by offering snapshots of how parents of minor children were
taxed immediately prior to and after the TCJA's enactment. Specifically,
while the TCJA expanded some of the general benefits available to parents
of minor children, itfailed to expand - and in critical cases, even preserve
-

specific benefits that are contingent on "parentingmodel." For instance,

the TCJA departedfrom historicalnorms by rolling back benefits reserved
for unmarriedparentsandfailedto make long over-due inflation adjustments
to provisions of the Code that allow dual earning couples and unmarried
parents (but not sole earningcouples) to recover childcarecosts incurredto
work outside the home. These snapshots reveal how Congress, through the
TCJA, picked winners and losers, enactingtax reform thatdisproportionately
favored sole earnersat the expense of otherparents.
Next, this article turns to other types of caregiving, such as elder care
and develops two more pre- andpost-reform snapshots. These pictures show
how the inequities that result from Congress'sfavoritism of sole earners
extend to other caregivingarrangementsand how these inequitiescompound
for members of the "sandwich generation" who provide both parental and
nonparentalcare. In the end, this article develops a series of snapshots that
contraststarkly with rosy politicalrhetoric and reveal that the TCJA not only
failed to addressmany pre-existingtax inequities between caregiversbut also
made them worse.
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INTRODUCTION

The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) changed the way families are taxed
starting in tax year 2018.' Politicians painted rosy pictures of families reaping
the benefits of tax reform.2 For example, President Donald Trump boasted
that the TCJA was the "biggest tax cut and reform in American history" and
provides "tremendous relief for working families;" 3 the U.S. Department of
Treasury's website casts the TCJA as "historic legislation" that "delivers
relief to American Families through tax cuts and vital reforms;" 4 and the
website for the U.S. House of Representative's Committee on Ways and
Means states that "the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act helps Americans of all walks
of life." 5 In reality, however, such generalizations cannot be made, and the
extent to which any one family gains or loses depends on particular facts.6
Even more obscured is the way in which the TCJA changed - and failed to
change - the relative taxation of taxpayers with different caregiving
responsibilities. This article seeks to provide much-needed clarity in this area.
To do so, this article first develops snapshots showing how parents of
minor children were taxed immediately before and after tax reform. There
are numerous (and constantly evolving) ways in which American parents
allocate the responsibilities of earning income and providing personal care to
children. America is no longer a country of sole earners. 7 But the Internal
Revenue Code (the Code) has historically made few differentiations among
"parenting models." Instead, Congress has preferred to tax similarly situated

Amendment of 1986 Code (Tax Cuts and Jobs Act), Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat.
2054 (2017) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). Many commentators
refer to this legislation as the "Tax Cuts and Jobs Act" or "TCJA," although it was not the
official name of the Act passed and signed into law.
2 S.A. Miller, Trump Riding High on Tax Cut Boon: Unleashed Economic
Miracle,
WASH.
POST,
June
29,
2018,
at
2,
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/jun/29/trump-tax-cut-boon-unleashedeconomic-miracle/ ("'At last, our country finally has a tax system that is pro-jobs, pro-worker,
pro-family and pro-America,' the president said at a White House event Friday marking six
months to the day since he signed the tax cuts into law.").
3 Press Release, White House, President Donald J. Trump's Tax Cuts are Helping
American Families Get Ahead (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/president-donald-j-trumps-tax-cuts-helping-american-families-get-ahead/.
4 U.S.

DEP'T

OF

THE

TREASURY,

TAX

CUTS

FOR

THE

AMERICAN

FAMILY,

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/top-priorities/tax-cuts-and-jobs-act/tax-cuts-for-theamerican-family.

5 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE, COMMITTEE WAYS AND MEANS, THE TAX CUTS AND
JOBS ACT TAXPAYER EXAMPLES: TAX HOW THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT HELPS AMERICANS
OF
ALL
WALKS
OF
LIFE,
https://republicanswaysandmeansforms.house.gov/uploadedfiles/taxpayerexamples.pdf.
6 See, e.g., Elaine Maag, How the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Reduced the Value of the
27,
2018)
(Nov.
CTR..:
TAXVOX,
TAX
POL'Y
Childcare
Credit,
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/how-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-reduced-value-childcare-credit.
7 See, e.g., PEW RES. CTR., THE AMERICAN FAMILY TODAY (Dec. 17, 2015),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/12/17/1-the-american-family-today/
(summarizing
statistics on rise of dual earners and unmarried parents).
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parents - i.e., parents caring for the same number of dependent children and
earning the same taxable income - homogenously, favoring general benefits
for all parents over specific benefits that are contingent on parenting model.'
The Code does contain a few of these specific benefits. First, the Code
has traditionally allowed unmarried parents and dual earning married parents
to recover a modest portion of the childcare costs they incur to work (and
which their sole earning married counterparts will not have to since they
retain a parent in the home). 9 However, because Congress failed for decades
to adjust these benefits for both inflation and the rising cost of childcare,
parents with enough income to claim these benefits were often able to recover
only a fraction of their actual costs.' 0 And because these "dependent care
benefits" have never been refundable, dual earners and unmarried parents of
lower income levels did not benefit at all - they were taxed just like their
sole earner married counterparts who did not have to incur childcare expenses
to work." Second, in addition to these modest dependent care benefits,
unmarried parents who qualify as heads of household (generally because they
provide primary care to a minor child) have traditionally been entitled to
apply a tax rate schedule and claim a standard deduction that is more
generous than the rates and deductions applicable to other unmarried
taxpayers."
But while the TCJA expanded some benefits generally available to
parents with primary care of minor children, it either ignored or curtailed the
specific benefits that are contingent on parenting model. For instance, it
rolled back the beneficial head of household rates1 3 and did not make
dependent care benefits for childcare refundable or give them long overdue
inflation adjustments. '" These snapshots reveal that Congress, through the
TCJA, picked winners and losers, disproportionately favoring sole earners
(who only gained but did not lose benefits) over all other parents (who had
benefits taken away).
But parents of minor children are not the only people who provide
personal care to others. Adult family members fall ill. And, given the aging

8 See, e.g., Pamela Gann, The EarnedIncome Deduction: Congress' 1981 Response to
the MarriagePenalty, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 468, at 475 (1983) ("Congress's adoption in 1948
of the criterion that 'equal income married couples pay equal taxes' reflected a system
designed for a society largely composed of one-worker married couples.").
9 I.R.C. § 21.
10 Shannon Weeks McCormack, America's (D)evolving Childcare Tax Laws, 53 U. GA.
L.

REV.

"

1093 (2019).
Id at 1165 (explaining history of non-refundability of dependent care credits).

12 Standard Deduction, 1970 to 2019, TAX PO'LY CTR. (Jan. 31, 2020),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/standard-deduction (showing pattern of allowing
heads of household a standard deduction that is roughly average the deduction available to
MFJ and UM taxpayers); FederalIndividual Income Tax Rates History, TAX FOUNDATION,
https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/fed_individualratehistory nominal.pdf
(showing pattern of allowing heads of household rates to break at rough average of MFJ and
UM breaks).
13 Amendment of 1986 Code (Tax Cuts and Jobs Act), supra note 1.
14 McCormack, supranote 10.
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of the baby boomer generation, American families increasingly find that
elderly relatives require personal care as well.' 5 This article next turns to
other types of caregiving and develops two more pre- and post-reform
snapshots. These snapshots expose how the inequities that result from
Congress's favoritism of sole earners extend to other caregiving
arrangements and compound for members of the "sandwich generation" 6
who provide both parental and nonparental care.
In the end, the snapshots developed in this article stand in stark contrast
to the rosy pictures painted by politicians. Rather than helping families of "all
walks of life,"' 7 the TCJA not only failed to address pre-existing tax
inequities between caregivers but also made them worse.
This article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a snapshot of the way in
which parents of minor children were taxed immediately prior to and after
the TCJA's enactment and shows how the TCJA's failure to expand and, in
some cases, even maintain benefits contingent on parenting model
disproportionately favored sole earners; Part II turns to other types of
caregiving, such as elder care, and shows how the inequities described in Part
I extend and compound for taxpayers with other caregiving obligations; Part
III synthesizes the snapshots discussed in the previous Parts and sketches
avenues for future conversations about the taxation of caregivers, which will
be undertaken in companion work. A brief conclusion follows.
II. PARENTING MINOR CHILDREN

There are many types of caregiving arrangements. It makes sense to begin
a discussion about the taxation of caregivers by focusing on parents of minor
children for three reasons. First, the Code provides specific benefits to those
who undertake these caregiving roles. Second, minor children generally
require both personal and financial care. Of course, one might reasonably
argue about the age at which this ceases to be true, but most people think
young children (however the margins are drawn) must be cared for to be safe,
let alone thrive. Third, it is well accepted that parents have an obligation to
provide this personal care to their minor children.
The Code (both pre- and post-reform) divides parents of minor children
(hereinafter parents) using bright lines. First, parents that are married under
federal law are separated from those that are unmarried, regardless of
cohabitation.1 8 Next, sub-categories emerge. Married parent families are subcategorized based on the number of wage earners. Married parents fall into
the sole earner category if one parent earns every dollar of taxable income,
and they fall into the dual earner category if both parents earn some income

15

Id.

16 See infra notes 116-118.
17
18

See COMMITTEE WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 5.

I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d).
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in the external workforce.1 9 By contrast, unmarried parent families are subcategorized as (roughly) primary and nonprimary caregivers 20 While the
primary caregiver often qualifies as a head of household and is eligible for
certain benefits attendant to that status, the nonprimary caregiver will
generally be treated like any other unmarried individual. 21
Much has been written to criticize these categorizations.2 2 This article
does not seek to contradict this work. Instead, it aims to clarify how the TCJA
changed the relative taxation of the parenting models it acknowledges,
something that is sorely needed given the complexity of tax reform and
oversimplified political rhetoric surrounding it.
In order to do so, the remainder of this article considers five hypothetical
taxpayers. The first two taxpayers do not have children but differ in marital
status: "Franz Solo" is not married while "Thelma & Louise" are happily
married to one another. The next three taxpayers each provide primary care
to two minor children but employ three different parenting models to do so.
"T'Challa & Nakia" are married and employ the dual earner model - that
is, both parents are employed in the external workforce. Like them, "Ozzie
& Harriet" are also married but only Harriet works outside the home (i.e.,
they are sole earners). Finally, "Shuri" is an unmarried parent who supports
her two children through paid market labor. This analysis assumes that none
of the taxpayers provides personal care to other dependents (e.g., elderly
relatives). Part II expands the hypotheticals to incorporate other caregiving
responsibilities.
A. Pre-TCJA
Assume first that each of the hypothetical taxpayers above have "positive
tax liabilities" - that is, they have sufficient taxable income to absorb all
nonrefundable tax benefits and, as a result, do not claim refundable credits
such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) or Additional Child Tax Credit
(ACTC) discussed in Part I.A.2. To understand how the Code differentiates
between the parenting models it recognizes, it is helpful to first understand
how taxpayers with the same taxable income but without children are taxed.
The discussion, therefore, begins with Franz Solo and Thelma & Louise.

19 This category emerges because dual earners (but not sole earners) are eligible to
recover a portion of childcare costs incurred while working. See I.R.C. §§ 21, 129.
20
21

See I.R.C. § 2(b) (defining head of household).

See id.
See, e.g., Anne Alstott, Updating the Welfare State: Marriage, the Income Tax, and
Social Security in the Age oflndividualism, 66 TAX LAw REv. 695, 700 n.23 (2013) (citing "a
number of scholars in taxation and family law [that] have questioned the law's reliance on
outdated categories, including formal marriage and the nuclear family."); see also Anthony
Infanti, DecentralizingFamily:An Inclusive ProposalforIndividual Tax Filing in the United
States, 3 UTAH L. REv. 605, 605 (2010).
22
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Positive Tax Liabilities
a.

Childless Unmarried Taxpayers

In 2017, all taxpayers could claim a standard deduction (a fixed dollar
deduction that could be claimed in lieu of so-called itemized deductions,
which include deductions for certain medical expenses, 23 charitable
contributions, 2 4 and home mortgage interest2 5 ) and personal exemptions to
reduce their taxable income. Together these two items created a "zerobracket amount" - taxpayers earning less than the sum of these amounts
would not have tax liability that year.
In 2017, the zero-bracket amount for unmarried, childless taxpayers was
$10,400, comprised of a $6,350 standard deduction 2 ' and a personal
exemption of $4,05027 (unless one earned over $261,500, at which point the
personal exemption phased out and was lost completely once taxable income
exceeded $384,000).28
Presuming Franz Solo did not earn income exceeding the phase-out
threshold, he could have reduced his taxable income by the zero-bracket
amount and then applied the rates applicable to unmarried filers. 29 The United
States utilizes a progressive income tax, taxing bands of income at increasing
rates. In 2017, the rates for unmarried taxpayers were as follows:
30
TABLE I: 2017 TAX RATES FOR UNMARRIED FILERS

Tax Rate
10%
15%
25%
28%
33%
35%
39.6%

Income Band
$0 and $9,325
Between $9,326 and $37,950
Between $37,951 and $91,900
Between $91,901 and $191,650
Between $191,651 and $416,700
Between $416,701 and $418,400
Above $418,400

b.

Childless, Married Taxpayers

Thelma & Louise are married and do not care for minor children. In
2017, they could choose between two filing statuses available to all couples
"married by the close of [the] taxable year. " 31 The majority of married

23 I.R.C. § 213.
24

I.R.C.§ 170.

25 I.R.C.§ 163(h).
26 Rev. Proc. 2016-55.
27

Id.

28

Id.
I.R.C. § 1(c).
See Kyle Pomerleau,

29
30

2017 Tax Brackets,
2016), https://taxfoundation.org/2017-tax-brackets/.

TAX

31 I.R.C. § 7703 (defining marriage for purposes of filing status).

FOUND.

(Nov.

10,
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couples that filed one return together 32 claimed "married filing jointly" 33
(MFJ) status while those that filed two individual returns claimed the
"married filing separately" 34 status. Assuming Thelma & Louise filed a joint
return in 2017, they could have claimed a standard deduction that was double
the amount unmarried taxpayers could claim - $12,700.35 They also could
have claimed two personal exemptions to reduce their taxable income by
$8,100.36 In 2017, the personal exemption phased out for MFJ taxpayers once
adjusted gross income reached $313,800 (compared to the $261,500 amount
applicable to unmarried taxpayers) and was lost completely once income
reached $436,300 (compared to $384,000 for unmarried taxpayers). 37
Thus, in 2017, the zero-bracket amount for MFJ taxpayers without
dependents was $20,100 (double the amount available to an unmarried
taxpayer like Franz Solo). Assuming Thelma & Louise claimed these benefits
in full, they would have then applied the tax rates for "married filing jointly"
status. A comparison of the 2017 tax rates for taxpayers that are unmarried
(UM) and married filing jointly (MFJ) is as follows:
TABLE

Tax
Rate
10%
15%
25%
28%
33%
35%
39.6%

II: 2017

TAX RATES FOR UNMARRIED AND MFJ FILERS 3 8

Income Band UM

Income Band MFJ

$0 and $9,325
Between $9,326 and $37,950
Between $37,951 and $91,900
Between $91,901 and $191,650
Between $191,651 and $416,700
Between $416,701 and $418,400
Above $418,400

$0 and $18,650
$18,651 and $75,900
$75,901 and $153,100
$153,101 and $233,350
$233,551 and $416,700
$416,701 and $470,000
Above $470,700

Thus, in 2017, the MFJ income bands were double the unmarried bands
for only the lowest two tax brackets. In tax parlance, MFJ couples in these
brackets enjoyed full "income splitting" i.e., they were
"treated. . .substantially as though they were two unmarried individuals each
with half of the total income of the couple." 39 After income exceeded
$75,901, however, the income bands for MFJ and unmarried taxpayers
converged. With these baseline facts in mind, we turn to the taxation of
parents in 2017.

32 Statistics of Income Bulletin Historical Table 1, IRS (Updated Nov. 19, 2019),
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-historical-table-1 (estimating that 95% of married
couples filed joint returns in 2016).
33 I.R.C. § 1(a).
34

I.R.C.§ 1(d).

35 Rev. Proc. 2016-55, supranote 26.
36
37
38

Id
Id
Pomerleau, supra note 30.

39 BERNARD D. JR. REAMS, INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1950-1951,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 11 (1982).
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Two MarriedParentTaxpayers

In 2017, T'Challa & Nakia and Ozzie & Harriet were entitled to the same
tax benefits as married, childless taxpayers - a $12,700 standard deduction
and personal exemptions worth $8,100 - and were also entitled to additional
benefits because of their parental obligations. 40
Married, childless taxpayers could have claimed two additional
exemptions for their dependent children. 4' Biological, foster, and adopted
children for whom parents provide primary care - meaning the child lives
with the parent and the parent provides most of the financial and personal
support - will generally qualify as dependents so long as they are younger
than 19 years of age. 42 These exemptions were subject to the same income
phase-outs applicable to married, childless taxpayers. 43 Assuming neither
T'Challa & Nakia nor Ozzie & Harriet earned enough to be phased out, the
zero-bracket would have been $28,900.
Thus far, only the increased personal exemption amount reflected the
presence of dependent children. But in 2017, after applying applicable rates,
some parents could also claim a $1,000 credit for each "qualifying child,"
allowing our taxpayers to reduce their tax liability by an additional $2,000.44
In 2017, however, the full credit was only available to MFJ taxpayers if
income did not exceed $110,000, at which point the credit phased out quickly
and was lost once income exceeded $135,000.45
At this point, all of the benefits for which T'Challa & Nakia are eligible
were precisely the same as those available to Ozzie & Harriet, despite the fact
that they used different parenting models. In fact, there was only one benefit
available to dual earners but not sole earners.
Dual earners like T'Challa & Nakia may have incurred sizeable costs to
provide care for their children while working. For many families, childcare
expenses will be the highest cost in their household budget, sometimes
exceeding housing costs and in-state college tuition. 46 In 2017, the Code
contained two provisions, allowing limited relief for these expenditures.
First, dual earners could claim a dollar-for-dollar credit for childcare
expenses to reduce their tax liability. However, the credit was capped. Once
a family earned more than $43,000 (far less than the median income for all
40 I.R.C.

§ 67(c).

41 I.R.C. § 152 (defining dependent).
42 See I.R.C. §152(c) (defining "qualifying child" and noting that children
may qualify
as dependents between the ages 19 and 24 if they are students and individuals other than
biological, foster and adopted children may qualify depending on their relationship with the
taxpayer).
43 I.R.C. § 151(d)(3); see, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2016-55(.24) (2016) (promulgating
personal exemption amounts and phase outs).
44 I.R.C. § 24 (qualifying children must meet requirements to qualify as dependents but
be older than 17 years of age).
45 I.R.C. §151(d)(3); see, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2016-55(.24), supra note 43.
46 Parents and the High Cost of Childcare, CHILD CARE AWARE
20
(2017), https://usa.childcareaware.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/2017CCAHighCostReportFINAL.pdf.
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'

families in 201747),48 they could credit no more than $1,200 for two or more
children and $600 for one child. 49 Alternatively, they could claim an
exclusion (to reduce their taxable income), limited by a $5,000 cap. 5 ' The
actual tax savings of the exclusion depended on the family's marginal tax
bracket but could never exceed $2,000 even for the richest taxpayers. 5
But regardless of whether the exemption or credit was claimed, the relief
dual earner received from these "dependent care benefits" was severely
limited. As I have previously explained, 52 in many instances, working
families received tax relief for only a fraction of their actual childcare costs.
And, as I have also explained, this situation occurred because Congress failed
for nearly three decadesto even adjust these benefits for inflation, no less the
rising cost of childcare. 53 These stringent limitations also applied to
unmarried parents such as Shuri, to whom we now turn.
d.

UnmarriedParents

While unmarried individuals, like Franz Solo and Shuri, may both claim
"single" status, the Code also allows many unmarried parents to file as "heads
of household." 54 Generally, "head of household" filing status can be claimed
when an unmarried taxpayer has primary care of a qualifying individual,
which makes it different from all other filing statuses whose eligibility does
not turn on whether the taxpayer cares for dependents. More specifically, a
taxpayer can file as a head of household if (s)he is unmarried at the end of
the taxable year and maintains - i.e., pays more than half the cost of5 - a
household that is the principle place of abode of both the taxpayer and a
qualifying individual (which generally includes dependent children discussed
above) for more than half of the year. 56
In 2017, the Code differentiated between unmarried and married parents
in two main ways. First, while all married taxpayers, regardless of number of
children were entitled to the same standard deduction ($12,700 in 2017),
heads of household such as Shuri could claim a standard deduction that was
greater than the deduction available to unmarried taxpayers without children.
47 U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables: Table H-8. Median Household
Income by State (Last Revised Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/timeseries/demo/income-poverty/historical-income-households.html.
48 I.R.C. § 21.
49 Id.
50 I.R.C.

51 I.R.C.

§ 129.
§ 1.

52 See, e.g., Shannon Weeks McCormack, Over-Taxing the Working Family: Uncle Sam
and the Childcare Squeeze, 114 MICH. L. REv. 559 (2016); Shannon Weeks McCormack,
Postpartum Taxationfor the Squeezed Out Mom, 105 GEO. L. J. 1323 (2017); McCormack,
supra note 10.
53 McCormack, supranote 10.

54 I.R.C. § 2(b).
5 Treas. Reg. § 1.2-2(d) (1971) ("A taxpayer shall be considered as maintaining a
household only if he pays more than one-half the cost thereof for his taxable year.").
56

I.R.C. § 2(a)(b).
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In 2017, the standard deduction for heads of household was $9,350
roughly the average of the standard deduction available to UM and MFJ
taxpayers."
In 2017, Shuri would have also been entitled to three personal exemption
amounts - $12,150 - one for her and each of her two dependent children.
Thus, in 2017, the zero-bracket amount for heads of households with two
children was $21,500. After Shuri reduced her taxable income by this
amount, she would have applied the tax rates for the head of household (HH)
status. In 2017, these rates compared with the rates for taxpayers claiming
married filing jointly (MFJ) and unmarried (UM) statuses as follows:
TABLE

III: 2017 TAX RATES,

UNMARRIED, MARRIED FILING JOINTLY,
58
AND HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD

Tax
Rate
10%

Income Band
UM
$0 and $9,325

Income Band
MFJ
$0 and $18,650

Average

15%

Between $9,326
and $37,950

$18,651 and
$75,900

$13,988 and
$56,925

Income
Band HH
$0 to
$13,500
$13,501 and
$50,801

25%

Between $37,951

$75,901 and

$56,926 and

$50,801 and

28%

and $91,900
Between $91,901
and $191,650

$153,100
$153,101 and
$233,350

$122,500
$122,501 and
$212,500

Between
$191,651 and
$416,700
Between
$416,701 and
$418,400
Above $418,400

$233,551 and
$416,700

$212,501 and
$416,700

$416,701 and
$470,000

$416,701 and
$444,200

Above
$470,700

Above $444,200

$131,200
$131,201
and
$212,500
$215,501
and
$416,700
$416,701
and
$444,550
Above
$444,551

33%

35%

39.6%

$0 to $13,987

While MFJ taxpayers used the same rate schedule regardless of whether
they provided personal care to minor children, heads of household were
entitled to a schedule that was more favorable than the one that applied to
unmarried taxpayers without children. 59 These different rates constituted the
second HH benefit available in 2017.
As can be seen, the HH rates "broke" at points sandwiched between the
UM and MFJ breaks. For instance, while the first $9,325 earned by an
unmarried taxpayer is taxed at 10% and the first $18,650 earned by a MFJ
couple was taxed at that rate, the 10% bracket applied to the first $13,500
earned by the head of household. The italicized column marked "Average"
shows how these tax bands would appear if HH rates were the mathematical
average of the MFJ and UM bands. As it shows, while some breaks were not

5
58

Rev. Proc. 20 16-55, supranote 26.
Id

59 TAX Po'LY CTR., supra note 12.

64

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 40.1:53

an exact average, they were usually close (though the 15% bracket was
$6,000 off to the head of household's detriment). As a result, heads of
household enjoyed some - though not all - of the income splitting benefits
MFJ couples enjoyed.
The two head of household benefits - the averaged standard deduction
and beneficial tax rates - have two design features worth questioning.60
First, HH benefits do not increase as number of dependents increase. 6 1 A head
of household will receive the same benefits if she cares for one child or five.
Second, the benefits depend on one's marginal tax bracket. For instance, the
benefits offered by the averaged standard deduction are worth more to those
in higher brackets than lower brackets, creating the well-known "upside
down" subsidy effect.62
In 2017, after calculating this pre-credit tax liability, heads of household
were entitled to the same $1,000 per child credit as MFJ parents. Thus, Shuri
could have potentially claimed a $2,000 credit to reduce her tax liability.
However, the phase out for heads of households began at $75,000 - earlier
than the $110,000 threshold for MFJ taxpayers.6 3
Finally, assuming Shuri, like many heads of household, utilized external
childcare to work outside the home, she would have been entitled to the same
relief for childcare costs as dual earner couples but also subject to the same
stringent limitations. 64
The following chart provides a summary of how each of the hypothetical
taxpayers were taxed immediately before the TCJA, if they had positive tax

liabilities:

&

60 See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Children and Income Tax, 49. TAX L. REV. 349, 405
(1993) (income splitting weak rationale for head of household benefits); Jacob Goldin
Zachary Liscow, Beyond Head of Household: Rethinking the Taxation of Single Parents, 71
TAX L. REV. 367 (2018).
61 Goldin & Liscow, supranote 60, at 396.
62

Id at 395.

63 I.R.C. § 24.
64 See I.R.C. §§ 21, 129 (making no distinction between heads of households and dual
earners).
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TABLE IV: SUMMARY FOR POSITIVE TAX LIABILITIES, 2017

Personal
Exemption

$4,050

2x
$4,050

Standard
Deduction

$6,350

Zero
bracket
(sum of
above)

$10,350

2x
$6,350 =
$12,700
$20,900

Rates

Unmarried

HH, n
children

Dual
Earners, n
children
2 x $4,050
+
$4,050 x n
2 x $6,350
= $12,700

Sole
Earners, n
children
2 x $4,050
+
$4,050 x n
2 x $6,350
= $12,700

$4,050
$4,050 x n

$20,900 + n
x $4,050

$20,900 +

$13,400

n x $4,050

$4,050 x n

+

MFJ, no
children

Approximate
Average =
$9,350
+

UM, no
children

Income

Income

Income

Roughly

See Table

splitting

splitting

splitting

average

III

mainly in
first two
brackets

mainly in
first two
brackets

mainly in
first two
brackets

breaks
allowing for
some income

splitting
when
available to

N/A

N/A

Credit

Adjustment
for
working
childcare
expenses?

N/A

N/A

MFJ
n x $1,000

n x $1,000

n x $1,000

Phase-out:

Phase-out:

Phase-out:

$110,000-

$110,000-

Capped
Savings

N/A

$75,000
68% of MFJ
Capped
Savings

$1,200 -

$1,200

-

Child Tax

$2,000 if

$2,000 if

earnings

earnings

>$43,000

> $43,000

As the discussion has also shown, the pre-TCJA Code differentiated
between dual earners and sole earners with positive tax liabilities in a singular
respect - it allowed dual (but not sole) earners to deduct a (frequently very
limited) portion of the childcare costs incurred to work. To this, the Code
added two further differentiations for heads of households with positive tax
liabilities by allowing for beneficial head of household rates and an average
standard deduction (or, equivalently, an averaged zero bracket). This can be
summarized as follows:
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TABLE V: DIFFERENTIATIONS BETWEEN ACKNOWLEDGED PARENTING

MODELS, 2017
Parenting Model
Dual and Sole Earners
HH and Sole Earners

HH and MFJ

.
.
"
"
.
"

Differentiations
Childcare expenses (limited)
Childcare expenses (limited)
HH Rates
Averaged Standard Deduction/Zero
Bracket
HH Rates
Averaged Standard Deduction/Zero
Bracket

However, in 2017, these few and modest differentiations were largely
eliminated for taxpayers with negative tax liabilities.
2.

Negative Tax Liabilities, Pre-TCJA

Taxpayers with negative tax liabilities in 2017 (e.g., those earning less
than the standard deduction and personal exemption amount) may have been
entitled to tax refunds. This occurs only when the Code specifically makes a
tax benefit refundable. Most relevantly in 2017, some taxpayers were entitled
to receive refunds through the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). 65 While its
scope was once far more modest, the EITC now operates as one of America's
main "anti-poverty devices." 66 The similarly-refundable Additional Child
Tax Credit (ACTC) may supplement refunds available under the EITC, but
the benefits were more modest. Both of these benefits were designed not only
to alleviate poverty but also to encourage low-income taxpayers to engage in
paid work.67 As a result, while a taxpayer must have sufficiently low earnings
to receive benefits from these provisions, they also must have enough earned
income to be eligible (e.g., taxpayers with zero earnings cannot receive
benefits). This Part will compare the relative taxation of the five hypothetical
families in 2017 in these lower income ranges.
a.

Childless Taxpayers

In 2017 (and traditionally), the EITC provided only modest relief for
taxpayers without dependent children. 68 For unmarried taxpayers such as

65 I.R.C.§ 32(a).

66 See, e.g., Dennis Ventry, The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The Political
History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 1969-1999, 53 NAT'L TAX. J. 983, 996 (2000)
("[M]uch to everyone's surprise ... at the end of the 1970s ... [the EITC] would no longer
comprise simply a modest work subsidy ...
[but would instead] represent an anti-poverty
device .... ").
67 Many have criticized this. See, e.g., Anne Alstott, Does the EITC Make Work Pay?
73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285 (2010); Dorothy Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax
Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 790 (2007).
68 Kerry Ryan, EITC as Income (In)Stability?, 15 FLA. TAX REv. 583, 593 n.33 ("In
2001, only two percent of total EITC dollars went to childless income tax filers, while 98
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Franz Solo, the EITC increased from zero to $510 as earned income increased
from zero to $6,650.69 The maximum $510 credit was available for earnings
between $6,650 and $8,350, at which point the EITC was gradually reduced
and lost completely once earnings exceeded $15,000.70
In 2017, childless married taxpayers such as Thelma & Louise were
entitled to the same EITC as unmarried, childless taxpayers like Franz Solo
over earned income ranges $0 to $8,350.71 However, Thelma & Louise were
entitled to the maximum $510 credit until earned income exceeded $13,950,
at which point the credit phased out and was lost at earned income level
$20,600.72 In other words, for non-parents with negative tax liabilities, the
Code differentiated between unmarried and MFJ taxpayers by providing
more generous phase-outs to the latter. In 2017, the Child Tax Credit was
partially refundable as an Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC). Because only
taxpayers with dependent children could claim the ACTC, it was not
available to childless taxpayers like Franz Solo and T'Challa & Nakia.
b.

MarriedParent Taxpayers

By deliberate design, the EITC offers far more relief to taxpayers with
dependent children than to non-parents. 73 And, as mentioned above, the
ACTC is exclusively available to parents. In 2017, married taxpayers with
two children could claim a maximum credit of $5,616 while earned income
was between $14,000 and $23,950.74 The credit phased down after that point
and was not lost until income exceeded $50,500.75
The ACTC was enacted to supplement the relief provided by the EITC. 76
In 2017, some taxpayers could claim a portion of the $1,000 per child CTC
as a refund if they did not have enough tax liability to absorb it (e.g., a family
with two children whose tax liability did not exceed $2,000).77 In 2017, a
portion of the CTC was refundable to those whose income exceeded $3,000
(again, the minimal threshold was meant to limit relief to those taxpayers
engaged in the external workforce). Specifically, eligible parents could
receive a refund equal to 15% of the amount by which their income exceeded

percent of the total EITC expenditures were paid to income tax filers with at least one

qualifying child.").
69 IRS

PUBLICATION

596

EARNED

INCOME

CREDIT

(EIC)

(2017),

https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p596-2017.pdf.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72

Id.

73 Ryan, supranote 68.
74 IRS PUBLICATION 596, supra note 69.

5 Id.
76 Larry Zelenak, Tax or Welfare: The Administrationof the EITC, 52 UCLA LAw REV.
1867 (2005) (discussing use of ACTC to make EITC's phase-out less steep).
77 Jobs Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 101, 117
Stat 753 (2003).
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$3,000.78 Thus, a married couple filing jointly with two children that earned
income equal to $9,000 could claim a refund equal to $900 (15% of $6,000).
Married couples with two children earning around $13,300 would be able to
receive a full $2,000 refund and would continue to be able to do so as long
as their income was low enough that a full refund was available (i.e., that
they did not have positive tax liability to absorb the credit).
Neither the EITC nor the ACTC differentiated between married parent
models. Thus, sole earning parents (such as Ozzie & Harriet) and dual
earning parents (such as T'Challa & Nakia) were entitled to the same relief
under these provisions. Added to this indifference, recall that the 2017 Code
allowed dual (but not sole) earners to claim a "working childcare credit" or
"dependent exemption" to reflect an often modest portion of their childcare
costs incurred while working. 79 But these benefits were not (nor have they
ever been) refundable, 80 so dual earner families without positive taxable
income could not receive any relief from these provisions at all.
Thus, at negative income levels, the 2017 Code was completely
indifferent between the dual earner and sole earner models - dual earning
parents would be taxed exactly like their sole earning counterparts, who did
not have to incur any childcare expenses to work. 81
c.

UnmarriedParents

The EITC is the same for heads of households and MFJ parents over
income ranges $0 through $18,350.82 However, the EITC begins to phase out
earlier for heads of household - the HH phaseout begins at $18,350 (versus
$23,950 MFJ). 83 And HH's with one, two and three children lose their entire
EITC once income exceeds $39,650, $45,050, and $48,350 respectively. 84
By contrast, MFJs lose the EITC for one, two and three children once income
exceeds $45,250, $50,600 and $53,900 respectively. 85
The Additional Child Tax Credit did not differentiate among parenting
models at all, consistent with the EITC's pattern, which does not differentiate
between HH and MFJ parents within the income ranges that are likely to
implicate the refundable portion of the ACTC.
The discussion of how dual earners, sole earners and heads of household
were taxed immediately before the TCJA is summarized below:

78 IRS PUBLICATION 972 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p972.pdf.
79 IRS PUBLICATION 17 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p17-2017.pdf.

Maag, supra note 6.
81 For further discussion on this point, see Dorothy Brown, Separate but Unequal, 54
80 See
EMORY
82

L. J. 757 (2005).
IRS PUBLICATION 596, supra note 59.

83

Id

84

Id

85

Id.
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TABLE VI: DIFFERENTIATIONS AMONG ACKNOWLEDGED PARENTING
MODELS, POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE TAX LIABILITIES, 2017
Parenting Model
Dual and Sole
Earners

HH and Sole
Earners

HH and Dual
Earners

Differentiations
Positive:
"
Childcare expenses (limited)
Negative:
"
Complete indifference
"
No distinction (childcare benefits nonrefundable)
Positive:
"
Childcare expenses (limited)
"
HH rates
"
Averaged standard deduction
Negative:
"
EITC phases out earlier for HH at higher income levels;
"
No distinction for childcare costs (childcare benefits
nonrefundable)
Positive:
"
HH Rates
"
Averaged Standard Deduction/Zero Bracket
Negative:
"
EITC phases outs earlier for HH at higher income levels

This Section now turns to the way the TCJA changed - and failed to
change - the taxation of the parenting models the Code recognizes.
B. Taxing Parents, Post-TCJA

The TCJA changed the way parents were taxed in various ways starting
in tax year 2018. In general, by expanding general benefits available to all
taxpayers while curtailing or ignoring specific benefits that are contingent on
parenting model, the TCJA selected sole earners as its winners at the expense
of all other parents. In doing so, the TCJA not only failed to address existing
tax inequities between parents but also made them worse.
1.

Positive Tax Liabilities

The TCJA repealed the personal exemption amount ($4,050 in 2017).86
It also roughly doubled the standard deduction for all taxpayers. 87 These two
changes are summarized below:

86 Amendment of 1986 Code (Tax Cuts and Jobs Act), supra note 1, at 2082.
87

Id. at 2072.
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TABLE VII: PERSONAL EXEMPTION REPEAL AND
88
"DOUBLED" STANDARD DEDUCTION

REPEALED
Standard
Deduction
DOUBLED

(6
$12,000

MFJ, no
children

-4

2 X $12,000
= $24,000

Zero bracket

4

-2;0

$12,000

$24,000

Dual
Earners, n
children

-

Sole
Earners, n
children

-

HH, n
children

Average =
-

UM, no
children

2X
$12,000 =
$24,000

2X
$12,000 =
$24,000

$18,000

6-2W

62%

$1,10=

e A$,5

e A$,5

e A$,5

$24,000

$24,000

$18,000

Non-parents benefitted more than parents from these changes in
isolation. All taxpayers of the same filing status received a doubled standard
deduction (which does not depend on number of dependents). 89 By contrast,
the personal exemption (which changes with number of dependents) was
repealed. 90 Thus, families of the same filing status experienced the same gain
from the doubled standard deduction but parents with dependent children lost
more from the repeal of the personal exemption than non-parents.
Furthermore, and by the same reasoning, the more dependents a parent had,
the more they lost from the repealed personal exemption amount (since each
dependent allowed another exemption).
But the TCJA also doubled the child tax credit from $1,000 to $2,000 per
child and greatly increased its phase-out thresholds, allowing MFJ couples to
claim the full credit until their taxable income exceeds $400,000 (up from
$110,000)91 and allowing heads of households to do so until income exceeds
$200,000 (up from $75,000).92 Presumably then, most parents of dependent
children would recoup a substantial portion of the losses they experienced
because of the personal exemption's repeal.
None of this, however, depends on parenting model. This next part looks
at how the TCJA changed the taxation of unmarried parents relative to
married parents. The short answer: it took some benefits away from
unmarried parents while granting new benefits to married parents.
a.

Unmarriedvs. MarriedParents

As discussed, the pre-TCJA Code contained two benefits that differentiated
unmarried from married parents. First, heads of households were entitled to
88

Id at 2072-84.

Id at 2072.
Id. at 2082.
91 Id. at 2073.
92 Id.
89
90
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a standard deduction that was roughly the average of the deduction allowed
to MFJ and UM taxpayers. Because the standard deduction was doubled for
all taxpayers, the TCJA basically maintained this benefit. 93 However, the
TCJA curtailed the second head of household benefit that existed under prior
law, changing the tax rates applicable to different filing statuses in significant
ways. The new rate schedule is below:
TABLE VIII: HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD RATES, POST-TCJA 94

4644
12%

Income Band UM
$0 and $04-.
$9,525
$-25$9,525
and
$$38,700

4n-$51,800

35%

Income Band
MFJ
$0 and $4
$19,030
$--45
$19,030 and
$;
$77,400

Average

HH

$0 to
$14,277
$14,278 and
$58,050

$0 to 6--M
$13,600

$7;#4=
$77,401 and
$44la
$165,000
$M4^14
$165,001 and
$^2-224
$315,000

$58,051 and

$4Q#4-$51,801

$123,750

and 42-;
$82,500

$x--41$38,701
and
$--$82,500

38%
24%

$9-4-;04=$82,501 and
$-x-4 $157,500

aM4

$-x-4 $157,501
and $446#Q
$200,000

$-44
$315,001 and
$446Q
$400,000

$236,251
and
$300,000

$44Q7=$200,001
and $444'
$500,000

$146E,7=

$300,001
and
$550,000

35%

39A%
37%

Above $^4#49
$500,000

$400,001 and
$4=7
14
$600,000
Above
$4=7QQ9
$600,000

and
0

22%

32%

-$4Q5$13,600

$123, 751
and
$236,250

Above
$550,000

--

6

$82,501 and
$$157,500

$

Tax
Rate
10%

$157,501 and
$4'
$200,000
$4464
$200,001 and
$4

$500,000
$4
$500,000

Thus, the TCJA lowered the tax rates for all filers. But it also changed
the way the rates "break," eliminating some head of household benefits while
making the MFJ rates more favorable than before.
Recall that in 2017, MFJ taxpayers enjoyed income splitting at only the
lowest two brackets. However, after the TCJA, MFJ taxpayers enjoy income
splitting through the first five brackets until income exceeds $400,000.95 Also

93 This change alone benefitted unmarried taxpayers slightly more than married
taxpayers, but both viewed alone and combined with the other changes discussed thus far, this
did little to change the relative taxation of the parental caregiving models the Code chooses to
acknowledge.
94 I.R.C. § 1(j)(2).
95 Id
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recall that in 2017, heads of households enjoyed some of these benefits
because HH rates broke between MFJ and UM breaks. If the TCJA had
followed this pattern, heads of households would have benefitted from the
expanded income splitting benefits enjoyed by MFJ filers.
But the TCJA did not do so, and instead rolled benefits back
substantially. As shown above, after the two lowest brackets, the HH breaks
are substantially different from the UM/MFJ average, to the head of
household's detriment. In fact, other than the lowest two brackets, the TCJA
eliminated HH rate benefits, allowing HH bands to converge with UM bands
while MFJ bands diverged from both.
Thus, the TCJA curtailed one of the main distinctions the Code made
between unmarried and married parents, breaking not only with patterns
established by immediately prior laws but also with historical norms. 96
The next Part turns to how the TCJA changed the relative taxation of dual
and sole earner married parents with positive tax liabilities. The short answer:

it didn't.
b.

Dual- and Sole-EarnerMarriedParents

As discussed, the TCJA changed the rates applicable to MFJ taxpayers,
allowing full income splitting at all levels except for the highest two brackets.
Furthermore, it doubled the per child credit available to all taxpayers while
drastically increasing phase-out thresholds. But these changes make no
differentiation between dual and sole earners - they are available to all MFJ
parents.
As discussed in Part I.B, the Code does contain two provisions that,
before the TCJA, allowed dual earner and unmarried parents very limited
relief for the childcare costs they incurred while working.9 7 The TCJA did
not alter these particular benefits at all, not even to make inflation
adjustments that had not been made for almost thirty years,98 a failure that
also affected heads of household.
2.

Negative Tax Liabilities

The TCJA did not modify the EITC in any way that meaningfully altered
the relative taxation of parenting models. The TCJA did make modest
changes to the ACTC, which increased the availability and magnitude of
benefits offered. For instance, the "refundability" threshold was reduced
from $3,000 to $2,400, and the maximum amount refundable was raised from
$1,000 to $1,400 per child (though not raised to the $2,000 per child credit

96 The practice of "sandwiching" the HH rates between the UM and MFJ rates began in
1951 and Congress generally maintained this pattern for seventy years until the TCJA largely
abandoned it. See TAX FOUNDATION, U.S. FEDERAL INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATES, HISTORY
1913-2013 (Oct. 17 2013), https://taxfoundation.org/us-federal-individual-income-tax-rateshistory-1913-2013-nominal-and-inflation-adjusted-brackets/.
97 See supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
98

McCormack, supra note 10.
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available to taxpayers with positive tax liabilities).99 However, these benefits
are indifferent across - that is, the same for all - the recognized parenting
models. The TCJA failed to make dependent care benefits refundable.
3.

Summary of TCJA Changes to Parental Tax Laws

At positive income ranges, the TCJA curtailed head of household
benefits and ignored working childcare benefits. At lower income ranges, it
once again failed to make working childcare benefits refundable. The
discussion is summarized below:
TABLE IX: DIFFERENTIATIONS AMONG PARENTING MODELS, POST-TCJA

Parenting Model
Dual and Sole
Earners

HH and Sole
Earners

Differentiations
Positive: NO CHANGE
*
Childcare expenses (limited)
Negative: NO CHANGE
"
Complete indifference
"
No distinction (childcare benefits nonrefundable)
Positive:
*
Childcare expenses (limited)
" HH rates CURTAILED
"
MFJ income splitting benefits EXPANDED
"
Averaged standard deduction
Negative: NO CHANGE
"
EITC phases out earlier for HH at higher income

levels;
"
HH and Dual
Earners

No distinction for childcare costs (childcare
benefits nonrefundable)

Positive:
* HHRates CURTAILED
"
MFJ income splitting benefits expanded
"
Averaged Standard Deduction/Zero Bracket
Negative: NO CHANGE
*
EITC phases outs earlier for HH at higher income
levels

These snapshots shine light on the overly-general claims made by various
politicians. Rather than showing that the TCJA helps families of "all walks
of life,"' these snapshots reveal that the TCJA picked winners and losers,
disproportionately favoring sole earners over all other parents and hurting
single parents more than married parents generally.
For positive tax liabilities, sole earners only gained benefits while
unmarried parents and dual earners also had some taken away. All parents
enjoyed the doubled CTC at positive income ranges.'' But unmarried

99 Compare I.R.C. §24(b) (2017), with I.R.C. §24(b) (2015).
100 COMMITTEE WAYS AND MEANS, supranote 5.

101 See I.R.C. § 24.
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parents lost some of the benefits previously offered by the head of household
rate schedule. And the value of dependent care benefits declined for both
unmarried and dual earners, since those benefits do not adjust for inflation
(and have not been adjusted for over thirty years). 0 2
For negative tax liabilities, the TCJA failed to make dependent care
benefits refundable, so the Code continued to be completely indifferent
between families that must incur childcare costs to work and those that do
not. In sum, the TCJA did nothing to address existing tax inequities between
parents and added some more of its own.
Of course, minor children are not the only individuals that require
personal care. The next Part moves beyond minor children and looks at how
the Code taxes those with other caregiving responsibilities. It shows that the
inequities resulting from the Code's favoritism towards sole earners extends
to other caregiving arrangements and compound for members of the
"sandwich generation" who have both parental and non-parental caregiving
roles.
III. BEYOND CARE OF MINOR CHILDREN

Many families now find that minor children are not the only individuals
for whom they must provide and/or obtain personal care. Perhaps most
notably, given several demographic trends - including the aging of the Baby
Boomer population and a general increase in life expectancies - the need
for eldercare is growing. 0 3 By 2050, the elderly population is expected to be
nearly double what it was in 2015.104 Recently, the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) estimated that over half of Americans turning age 65
by 2016 would eventually need long-term care.1 0 5
There is a growing body of data about elder-caregivers. In 2011, the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) recognized "the need for quality data on
how much time is devoted to eldercare and how it affects caregivers' lives"1 06
and introduced new questions into the American Time Use Survey

102 See

McCormack, supra note 10.

103 DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, NAVIGATING THE DEMANDS OF WORK AND ELDERCARE
9

(June 30, 2014), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/NavigatingTheDemandsOfWorkAnd
Eldercare.pdf. ("The first Baby Boomers reached the age of 65 in 2011, and roughly 10,000
Boomers continue to hit that milestone every day."); see also, Stephen Ferrante, The Sandwich
Generation: A Review of the Literature, 9 FLA. PUB. HEALTH REV. 95, 95 (2012),
http://www.ut.edu/uploadedFiles/Academics/CNHS/Health_SciencesandHumanPerform
ance/Public_Health/Florida_PublicHealthReview/FPHR2012pp095104DeRigneandFerran
te.pdf ("Several demographic trends are putting caregiving pressure on middle-aged adults.").
104 DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 103, at 9.
105 HHS OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND DISABILITY, LONGTERM SERVICES AND SUPPORT FOR OLDER AMERICANS: RISKS AND FINANCING (rev. Feb. 2016),

https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/106211/ElderLTCrb-rev.pdf.
106 Stephanie L. Denton, Adding Eldercare Questions
to the American Time Use Survey,
2012

BUREAU

OF

LABOR

STATISTICS,

MONTHLY

https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2012/1 1/art3full.pdf.

LABOR

REVIEW,

26,

26,
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(ATUS).10 7 The new ATUS questions seek to "measure how many unpaid
hours Americans spen[t] caring for older individuals."' 0 8
Averaging ATUS data for 2015-2016, the BLS reported that 41.3 million
individuals provided some type of unpaid eldercare,' 09 56% of whom were
women."' Some individuals provided unpaid eldercare for more than a
decade."' While ATUS data suggested that "[a]lmost one-half (48 percent)
of eldercare providers . . . provided [elder] care for 2 years or less . . . 14
percent . . . provided care for 10 years or more."" 2 Furthermore, regardless
of duration, this care is often time consuming to provide. ATUS data suggests
"forty-five percent of caregivers provided care daily or several times a
week.""1 3
The ATUS questions also shed light on the caregiving models being used
to provide eldercare. Many individuals and families are balancing the
burdens of eldercare with outside employment. Averaging the 2015 - 2016
data, the BLS found that, of the 41.3 million unpaid eldercare providers,
about 61% were also employed in some capacity" 4 and almost 45% were
employed full time (defined as working for over thirty-five hours per

week).'

'5

External work is, however, not the only competing demand facing unpaid
eldercare providers. Parental and eldercare responsibilities converge for
some families. Because many women are delaying the age at which they have
children," 6 many families find themselves part of the so-called "sandwich
generation,"" 7 providing care to minor children and elderly parents

107 Id. at 33.
108 Id. See also Amalavoyal V. Chari, et al., The Opportunity Costs ofInformal-Eldercare
in the UnitedStates: New Estimatesfrom the American Time Use Survey, 50(3) HSR: HEALTH
SERV.
RES.
871
(2015),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4450934/pdf/hesr0050-0871.pdf. For more
on the design of the questions, see generally Denton, supra note 106.
109 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Unpaid Eldercare in the United States-2017-2018

Summary, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/elcare.nro.htm.
110 Id.
"

BUREAU

OF

LABOR

STATISTICS, Eldercare Providers by

Sex

and Selected

CharacteristicsRelated to Care Provided, Averages for the Combined Years 2017-2018,
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/elcare.t02.htm.
112 Id.
113

Id.

114 Id.
115 Id.

116 Jooyeoun Suh, Measuring the "Sandwich": Carefor Children and Adults in the
American Time Use Survey 2003-2012, 37 J. FAM. ECON. ISS. 197, 197 (2016),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4883270/pdf/10834 2016 Article 9483.pdf
("As age at first birth has increased, along with life expectancy, the probability that adults will
face responsibilities for care of both young children and elderly parents has increased.").
117 See, e.g., Dorothy Miller, The Sandwich Generation:Adult Children of the Aging,

26(5)

SOC.

WORK

419,

419

(1981)

https://www.jstor.org/stable/23712207?seq=1#pagescantabcontents ("Adult children of
the elderly, who are 'sandwiched' between their aging parents and own maturing children, are
subject to a great deal of stress.").
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'

simultaneously. "a
The ATUS data provides information about this group, too. Averaging
2015 - 2016 ATUS data, the BLS reported that there were "8.7 million
eldercare providers who were [also] parents of children living at home [and
that] [o]f these parents, about one-third (33 percent) had a child under age 6,
and the remainder (67 percent) were parents whose youngest child was
between the ages of 6 and 17."119 Most of these members of the sandwich
generation were employed full time - "81 percent [of] eldercare providers
who were parents were employed, and 64 percent were employed full
time.""2 Furthermore, "[s]eventeen percent of eldercare providers who were
parents had no spouse or unmarried partner present in the household."' 2
To illustrate how the TCJA affected the taxation of those who provide
non-parental care, this Part turns back to the five hypothetical taxpayers, but
now assumes that each provides substantial personal care to an elderly
relative (Ernie).
A. Non-ParentalCaregiving, Pre-TCJA

1.

Positive Tax Liabilities
a.

UnmarriedChildless Taxpayers

Head of household status is not only available to parents of minor
children. Head of household benefits can be claimed by any unmarried
taxpayer that maintains (i.e., pays more than half the cost of) 2 2 a household
that is the principle place of abode of both the taxpayer and any "qualifying
individual" for more than half of the year, so long as other requirements are

met. 123
Recall that this article began its analysis with the care of minor children
for specified reasons. In addition to the pragmatic reason - i.e., that the Code
provides special benefits to primary caregivers of minor children - there is
relatively sound consensus that minor children require personal care and that
parents are responsible for giving it to them. Less agreement exists around
other caregiving arrangements.
Perhaps reflecting this, the process of applying the requirements to
Kiah L. Evans, et al., Working Sandwich Generation Women Utilize Strategies Within
and between Roles of Achieve Role Balance, 11(6) PLOS ONE, June 15, 2016, at 1,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4909236/pdf/pone.0157469.pdf ("increasing
number of women simultaneously balancing the roles of mother and parental care[giver].").
118

119 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Economic News Release, Unpaid Eldercare in the

United States, Table 9, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/elcare.t09.htm.
120 Id. (Showing within Tables 2 and 9 that eldercare providers who were parents were
less likely to provide daily care than the overall population of eldercare providers but were
just as likely to provide care several times a week).
121 Id.
122 Treas. Reg. § 1.2-2(d) (1971) ("A taxpayer shall be considered as maintaining a
household only if he pays more than one-half the cost thereof for his taxable year.").
123 I.R.C. § 2(b)(1)(A) (2012) (providing principal place of abode requirement).
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determine whether individuals for whom taxpayers like Franz Solo might
potentially claim head of household status and/or claim dependency
exemptions for individuals that are not qualifying children can feel
convoluted. 124 To be deemed a qualifying individual, Ernie must have had
gross income less than the now-repealed personal exemption amount (in
2017, $4,050).125 Furthermore, Franz Solo (and other unmarried, childless
taxpayers) must have generally provided a defined level of support to Ernie.
Specifically, Franz Solo must have either (a) provided over half of total
support for the taxable year; 2 1 or (b) if Franz Solo provided more that 10%
but less than 50% of total support but the support of multiple people together
represented half of the total support, unmarried, childless taxpayers like
Franz Solo could claim head of household status if each contributor agrees

he can do so.127
To synthesize, Franz Solo (and other unmarried, childless taxpayer) will
generally be able to claim head of household status only if four things are
true. First, Ernie generally resides with him by sharing a principal place of
abode for more than half of the year.1 28 Second, he pays more than half the
cost of a residence he shares with Ernie.1 29 Third, Ernie does not earn very
much income (in 2017 not over $4,050).130 And fourth, he provides that
person substantial support (either 50% or 10% with an agreement from
others). 131
There is one further nuance. If Ernie is Franz Solo's parent, he may claim
head of household status even if he/she lives in a different residence so long
as all the other head of household requirements are met and Franz Solo
provides half of the cost to maintain Ernie's residence.1 32
If these requirements were met such that Franz Solo qualified for head of
household status in 2017, he could have claimed the averaged standard
deduction and applied the beneficial rate structure described in Part I.
Further, if Franz Solo was able to file as head of household, Ernie must have
qualified as Franz Solo's dependent, as that is one of the requirements for
head of household status.1 33 Thus, Franz Solo would have also been eligible
to claim a personal exemption amount ($4,050) for Ernie.
But even if Franz Solo did not qualify as a head of household, he still
might have been able to claim an exemption for Ernie because Ernie may
have still qualified as Franz Solo's dependent if the only reason why Franz
Solo didn't qualify as head of household was that Ernie did not share a
124 I.R.C. § 2(b)(1)(A)(ii) (when an individual is not a qualifying child, taxpayer must be
able to claim individual for dependency exemption).

125 I.R.C. § 152(d)(1)(B).
126 I.R.C. § 152(d)(1)(C).
127 I.R.C. § 152(d)(3).
128 I.R.C. § 2(b)(1)(A).
129

I.R.C.

130

I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.

131
132
133

§ 2(b).
§ 152(d)(1)(B).
§ 152(d)(1)(C), (d)(3).
§ 2(b)(1)(B).
§ 2(b)(1)(A)(ii).
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residence with him and Franz Solo and Ernie have one of the relationships
the Code "counts." These relationships are as follows:
(A) A child or a descendant of a child.
(B) A brother, sister, stepbrother, or stepsister.
(C) The father or mother, or an ancestor of either.
(D) A stepfather or stepmother.
(E) A son or daughter of a brother or sister of the taxpayer.
(F) A brother or sister of the father or mother of the taxpayer.
(G) A son-in-law, daughter-in-law, father-in-law, mother-in-law,
brother-in-law, or sister-in-law. 134
If Ernie and Franz Solo did fit one of these relationships,1 35 Franz Solo
could claim Ernie as a dependent even if he did not share a principal place of
abode with Franz Solo for more than half the year and/or Franz Solo did not
pay half the cost of maintaining it. Ernie could qualify as Franz Solo's
dependent if he did not earn more than the dependency amount ($4,050) and
Franz Solo provided half of Ernie's support.1 36
There is still a bit more (if the reader is having trouble keeping this
together, imagine how Franz Solo, who may also be struggling to support
Ernie, feels). What if Franz Solo had to pay someone to care for Ernie while
working? It is possible that Franz Solo could qualify for the "dependency
care benefits" described in Part I. But the bar for doing so is high when nonparental care is involved. For Franz Solo (and non-parents generally) to
receive benefits that reflect the costs of care for Ernie (and non-minor
children generally) incurred while working, Ernie must once again have "the
same principal place of abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half of such
taxable year[.]"1 3 7 It will not matter how Franz Solo and Ernie are related to
one another.1 3 8 Nor will Ernie need to earn less than the dependency
exemption amount. Franz Solo will, however, still need to provide half of
Ernie's support. And most strictly, Ernie must be "physically or mentally
incapable of caring for himself or herself[.]"1 39
If all of these requirements are met, Franz Solo may be able to claim
dependency care benefits to reflect some of the costs he must incur to keep
Ernie safe while he works. There is one way he is lucky. As discussed in Part
I, dependency care benefits are severely limited. But because childless,
unmarried taxpayers like Franz Solo do not also have to pay for childcare,
they will not have "used up" this limit and may at least receive some tax
134

I.R.C. § 152(d)(2)(A)-(G).

Outside of these relationships, Ernie could not qualify as a dependent unless he had
"the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer and is a member of the taxpayer's
household[,]" so that head of household and dependency requirements collapse. I.R.C.
135

§ 152(d)(H).
136

I.R.C. § 152(d)(1)(B)-(C).
§ 21(b)(1)(B).

137 I.R.C.

138 Because individuals with whom taxpayer shares principal place of abode can count as
dependents regardless of relationship. Id.
139

Id.
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savings to reflect the costs of providing care to Ernie so that he can go to
work.
However, Franz Solo (and other unmarried, childless taxpayers) will still
probably hit that limit quickly. While data on eldercare costs is not as
developed as data on childcare costs, even "back of the napkin" math reveals
how stringent limitations are. If Franz Solo provides care for a "physically or
mentally" incapable Ernie while he works (say) 35 hours per week for 220
days (since there are about 250 working days in most years and we will
assume Franz Solo lucky enough to have about four weeks of vacation and
sick leave), he will hit the $3,000 cap for the dependency care credit unless
he pays the caregiver 39 centsper hour and will hit the slightly higher $5,000
cap for the dependency care exclusion unless he pays 65 cents per hour. Here
is another way that Franz Solo is unlucky. The 2017 Child Tax Credit, as the
name suggests, was available only to parents of minor children (under 17).140
The following synthesizes the varied moving parts that determine a
taxpayer's eligibility for head of household status, dependency exemption,
and dependent care provisions in 2017 when care for non-minor children is
involved:
TABLE X: TAX BENEFITS FOR UNMARRIED TAXPAYERS WITH
NON-PARENTAL CAREGIVING RESPONSIBILITIES141

HH
(beneficial
rates,
averaged
standard
deduction)
Dependency
exemption

Does

Must

Does

Does

Other

Relationship
Matter?

Ernie and
Franz
Share
Abode?

Ernie's
Income
Matter?

Requirements

N/A

Yes

Yes

Yes unless
share abode

Yes if not
otherwise

Yes

Amount of
Support
Franz
Provide
Matter?
> 50%; or if
others
combine to
50%, 10%
by
agreement
Yes

No

Yes

($4,050)
Dependent
care
benefits

Maintain
home (over
half cost)

qualifying
relationship
Yes

No, because
sharing
abode
required

b.

Physically or
mentally
incapable of
caring for self

MarriedChildless Taxpayers

Married childless taxpayers, like Thelma & Louise can never file for
head of household benefits, which are only available to unmarried taxpayers.
They may, however, have been able to claim the dependency exemption for
their care of Ernie if they met the various requirements described above.
140 I.R.C. § 24(c)(1).
141 I.R.C. §§ 2(b), 151, 152.
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If both Thelma & Louise are wage earners, they also might have been
able to claim limited dependency care benefits to reflect costs of caring for
Ernie while they are working. Of course, like Franz Solo and all other
taxpayers, they would need to meet the requirements described above, which
include Ernie being "physically or mentally" incapable of caring for himself.
Like Franz, Thelma & Louise are lucky in one respect - because they
do not have minor children to care for, they will at least receive some savings
from the dependency care provisions to reflect the costs they incur to keep
Ernie safe while they are working.
We now move onto families who are not so lucky, as they already provide
primary care to minor children. As will be illustrated, the inequities that have
been described in this Part and Part I compound for these members of the
"sandwich generation."
c.

Two MarriedParents in the Sandwich Generation

&

In 2017, both T'Challa & Nakia and Ozzie & Harriet could claim Ernie
as a dependent if they met the requirements described above. Like Thelma
Louise, they were not entitled to head of household benefits because they
were married.
While sole earners like Ozzie & Harriet retain a non-wager earner that is
available to care for children and (now) Ernie, T'Challa & Nakia do not have
this luxury. Like Franz Solo and Thelma & Louise, T'Challa & Nakia could
theoretically claim the limited dependency care benefits if they met the high
bar to do so (e.g., Ernie was physically and/or mentally incapable of caring
for himself).1 42 But unlike Solo and Thelma & Louise, T'Challa & Nakia
may have already hit their limit because they have minor children who
require care. As discussed in Part I, applicable limitations are so stringent that
parents paying for childcare may easily incur expenses that (perhaps far)
exceed the statutory limits. 4 3 Thus, it is not only possible but probable that
many dual earning parents with minor children will receive absolutely no tax
reduction to reflect the eldercare expenses they incur to provide care for
individuals that are (by statutory mandate) physically or mentally incapable
of caring for themselves, even though these costs are only incurred so that
the dual earner couple can work. Heads of household, like Shuri, will likely
find themselves in a similar situation.
d.

UnmarriedParents

Because Shuri already qualified for head of household status because of
her parenting responsibilities, she cannot receive additional head of
household benefits from that status. This results from the curious design
features of heads of household benefits, discussed in Part I, which are not
contingent on number of dependents.144
142

I.R.C. § 21(b)(1)(A)-(C).

143 See supra PartI.
144

Id.

2020 ]

Before and After Snapshots

81

&

In 2017, however, Shuri might have at least been able to claim Ernie as
an additional dependent if she met the requirements described. And like other
working caregivers, Shuri may have been able to claim dependency care
benefits for expenses paid to keep Ernie cared for while she worked, so long
as Ernie was sufficiently incapable of self-care. However, like T'Challa
Nakia, but unlike our childless taxpayers, she will not be able to do this if her
childcare expenses already exceeded stringent limits, a scenario that is very

likely.
The tax benefits each hypothetical taxpayer might have claimed in 2017
to reflect care of Ernie (and more generally, caregiving of non-minor
children) if they had positive tax liabilities is summarized below:
TABLE XI: 2017, TAXPAYERS WITH NON-PARENTAL CARE OBLIGATIONS1
Head of Household
Possibly Eligible?
b EDependent

Personal

45

Dependency Care
Benefits

Exemption
Franz Solo
Unmarried,
childless taxpayers

Yes - May qualify for
1) beneficial rates and
2) averaged standard
deduction if other
requirements met (see
Table Z)

Yes - $4,050

Yes, with stringent
limits

Thelma & Louise

No (married)

Yes - $4,050

Yes, if dual earners,
with stringent limits

Ozzie & Harriet
Married sole

No (married)

Yes - $4,050

No (sole earners)

T'Challa & Nakia
Dual earners

No (married)

Yes - $4,050

Yes, but probably
will not benefit
because childcare
expenses already
over limit

Shuri
Unmarried
parents

Yes but already
qualified because of
minor children-will,
therefore, receive no
additional HH benefits

Yes - $4,050

Yes, but probably
will not benefit
because childcare
expenses already
over limit

earners

-

A few general points emerge. In 2017, those in the sandwich generation
- i.e., those with parental and non-parental caregiving responsibilities
were likely to benefit only from the additional personal dependency
exemption of $4,050. In other words, in 2017, when parents entered the
sandwich generation by taking up care of Ernie, the Code gave them a $4,050
exemption. The tax savings of this exemption depended on their marginal tax
bracket and ranged from approximately $400 (at the lowest bracket) to
$1,600 (at the highest).
Of course, it might have cost a great deal more than $4,050 to provide
care for Ernie. Sole earners (like Ozzie & Harriet) at least had the option to
145 I.R.C. §§ 2(b), 151, 152.
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provide care to Ernie themselves. By contrast, dual earners (like T'Challa
Nakia) and unmarried parents (such as Shuri) did not have this option. But
because childcare expenses may have already exceeded the low statutory
limits of the dependency care provisions, these caregivers may have received
no relief for these expenditures, which Ozzie & Harriet had the ability to
avoid.
But the situation is even worse if our hypothetical taxpayers have
negative tax liabilities. In 2017, taxpayers that took up care of a dependent
who was not a minor child but with negative tax liabilities received no tax
benefits.
2.

Negative Tax Liabilities

As discussed in Part I, neither head of household nor dependency care
benefits were refundable in 2017.146 Thus, taxpayers without sufficient
taxable income or tax liability to absorb them received no relief to reflect care
expenses.
However, as also discussed in Part I, parents of minor children who had
negative tax liabilities might have been eligible to claim the refundable
Earned Income Tax Credit and partially refundable Additional Child Tax
Credit. 4 7 Furthermore, by design, the EITC was far greater for those who
provided primary care to minor children than for those who did not.1 48 This
generosity, however, does not extend to those who care for other dependents,
such as Ernie, that are not non-minor children. Indeed, the EITC does not
reflect these caregiving arrangements. And similarly, the ACTC is only
available to primary caregivers of non-minor children.
Thus, if any of our hypothetical families had negative tax liabilities and
took on care of Ernie, the Code would not have taken that into account in any
way. And again, while sole earners (like Ozzie & Harriet) might have avoided
great financial cost by providing needed care, our other taxpayers may have
had to incur substantial costs to provide care while working. But this did not
matter for tax purposes. For negative tax liabilities, all the taxpayers will
receive exactly the same refunds in 2017.
This Part now looks at how the TCJA changed this situation for nonparental caregivers. The short answer: the TCJA did nothing to address
existing inequities for those with non-parental caregiving responsibilities
and, in fact, curtailed the few benefits for which these caregivers had been
eligible. This can be expected to most adversely affect the finances of dual
earners and unmarried parents because, unlike sole earners, they will not be
able to avoid substantial expenditures by providing care to Ernie themselves.

146 See supra PartI.
147

Id.
148 Lawrence Zelenak, Redesigning the Earned Income Tax Credit as a Family-Size
Adjustment to the Minimum Wage, 57 TAX L. REV. 301, 306 (2004).
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B. Taxing Non-ParentalCare, Post-TCJA

1.

Positive Tax Liabilities
a.

UnmarriedTaxpayers

In 2017, since she already qualified for head of household status and had
probably already incurred childcare costs that exceeded the dependency care
provisions' stringent limitations, the only new benefit Shuri might have
claimed when she started to care for Ernie was the additional personal
exemption amount. But, as discussed in Part I, the TCJA repealed that
benefit.1 4 9
By raising the previously existing $1,000 per child credit to $2,000, the
TCJA compensated parents of non-minor children. But Congress was not so
generous to those with other caregiving obligations. For these other
caregivers, the TCJA added a $500 "Family Tax Credit," which can be
claimed by those who have dependents that are not minor children."5 For
almost all taxpayers with positive tax liabilities, this Family Tax Credit will
provide less benefit than the personal exemption did.
The one exception is that taxpayers with a marginal tax rate of 10%
(which is the lowest available tax bracket) will benefit slightly more.' 5 ' The
personal exemption amount would have provided $405 in tax savings (10%
multiplied by $4,050), while the dollar-for-dollar Family Tax Credit will
provide a full $500 in savings. However, for all other taxpayers, the Family
Tax Credit does not compensate for the repeal of the personal exemption. For
instance, taxpayers with marginal income tax rates of 25% would have
received a benefit of over $1,000 by claiming the 2017 personal exemption.
The TCJA's new Family Tax Credit cuts this in half. 5 2
And, of course, as discussed in Part I, the TCJA did not even adjust
dependency care benefits for inflation (a move that was over three decades
overdue).1 53 Unmarried parents like Shuri will, therefore, continue to receive
no benefit to reflect expenses incurred to provide care to Ernie while working
if, as is likely, childcare expenses already exceed stringent limits.
Franz may have lost even more than Shuri as a result of the TCJA's
changes. Unlike Shuri, Franz (and other unmarried, childless taxpayers)
stood to gain from claiming head of household status, since he did not have
other dependents, which qualified him for those benefits anyway. But as
discussed in Part I.C, the TCJA substantially rolled back the favorable tax

149 As also discussed, the TCJA doubled the standard deduction. But the standard
deduction does not depend on whether taxpayers have caregiving obligations at all and,
therefore, this benefit does not affect the relative taxation of caregivers and non-caregivers.
150 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11022, 131 Stat. 2054, 2073
(West).
151

Id.

152

I.R.C. § 24(h)(4).
See supra PartI.

153
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rates historically available to heads of household. 5 4 Thus, even if Franz
qualified for that status because of his care for Ernie (Shun already qualified
by virtue of caring for her children), the benefits he received post-TCJA
would be reduced at many income ranges. And like Shuri, Franz also could
have benefitted from claiming a personal exemption for Ernie, and will
generally receive less tax savings from the TCJA's replacement (the $500
Family Tax Credit).
b.

Married Taxpayers

Though they were not eligible to file as heads of household and,
therefore, cannot be said to have suffered by the TCJA's curtailment of
benefits that attend to that status, married taxpayers also lost the personal
exemption for Ernie in exchange for the generally lesser Family Tax Credit.
The way in which the TCJA affected the benefits available to taxpayers
when they have positive tax liabilities is summarized below. In general,
because our taxpayers took up care of Ernie, the post-TCJA Code will give
them $500.
TABLE XII: NON-PARENTAL CAREGIVERS, POST-TCJA

55

Dependency Care
Benefits

Possibly
Eliible?

HHDepede-y

Franz Solo

1) beneficial rates

Y

Unmarried,
childless
taxpayers

*CUR TAILED
andCredit
2) the averaged
standard deduction

$500 Family Tax

i

Thelma &
Louise

Cannot qualify

Y $,050
$500 Family Tax

Yes, if dual earners

HH

Exem-iee

May now qualify for

wt sie
it

stringent

Credit

Ozzie &
Harriet
Married sole
earners

Cannot qualify

y
,050
$500 Family Tax

No (sole earners)

Credit
Yes, but probably will

T'Challa &

Y

Nakia
Dual earners

Shuri
Unmarried
parents

2.

Cannot qualify

Already qualified
will receive no
additional benefit
from HH status

$050

$500 Family Tax
Credit

Y

'g5

$500 Family Tax
Credit

not benefit because
childcare expenses
already over limit
Yes, but probably will
not benefit because
childcare expenses
already over limit

Negative Tax Liabilities
The TCJA did nothing to change the situation for non-parental caregivers

154

Id
155 I.R.C.

§§ 2(b), 21, 24(h), 129, 151, 152.
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with negative tax liabilities. Unlike the Child Tax Credit, which is partially
though not fully refundable, the new Family Tax Credit is completely nonrefundable. If a taxpayer with negative tax liability takes up care for Ernie,
the tax laws have nothing to say about it.
The last two Parts have developed a series of snapshots that show how
different caregivers were taxed immediately before and after the TCJA took
effect. The final Part of this article synthesizes these snapshots and sketches
avenues for future work.
IV. SYNTHESIS AND AGENDA FOR FUTURE WORK

By rearranging a myriad of deck chairs, politicians were able to claim
that the TCJA helped working families from "all walks of life."1 56 But the
snapshots developed in Parts I and II expose very different pictures. At the
outset, generalizations are impossible. The extent to which any one family
gains or loses from tax reform depends on particular facts. 5 7 Moreover,
given the number of moving parts that determines a family's tax liability, it
has been easy for politicians to obscure how the TCJA changed - and failed
to change - the relative taxation of taxpayers with different caregiving
responsibilities. But the snapshots developed in this article reveal that
Congress, through the TCJA, chose winners and losers.
First, when the TCJA expanded benefits to caregivers, the changes
disproportionally favored sole earners over dual earners and unmarried
individuals. Second, when it curtailed benefits, the changes hurt unmarried
individuals and dual earners more than sole earners. Third, the TCJA did
nothing to address existing inequities between caregivers, which acted to the
detriment of heads of household and dual earners.
A. Synthesizing Snapshots: Declaring Winners and Losers

1.

Among Parents of Non-Minor Children

Among caregivers, sole earning married parents with positive taxable
income probably benefited most from tax reform. First, as discussed in Part
I, tax rates were reconfigured to expand the benefits of income splitting
among married couples. Second, while the personal exemption amount was
repealed, the newly doubled Child Tax Credit can be expected to provide
more tax savings. So that in the end, sole earner parents with positive taxable
income only gained from the TCJA but had no benefits taken away. They
were, among caregivers, Congress's clearly selected winners.
Others did not fare as well. While heads of household and dual earning
parents with positive taxable income enjoyed some expanded benefits, they
also lost benefits. Like sole earners, dual earners will enjoy the new MFJ
rates, which expanded income splitting for married couples as well as the

156 COMMITTEE WAYS AND MEANS, supranote 5.

157 See, e.g., Maag, supranote 6.
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doubled Child Tax Credit.1 58 However, because Congress did not adjust
limitations within the dependency care provisions (a move which is more
than thirty years overdue), dual earners will continue to see the value of those
benefits erode.1 59
Parents that were heads of household suffered even more at positive
income ranges. In addition to seeing the value of their dependent care benefits
decline, the heads of household rates were curtailed for all but the first two
brackets.
As for parents with negative tax liabilities, the TCJA did nothing to
address existing inequities. Dependent care benefits remain non-refundable
so that sole earning parents will be taxed exactly the same as unmarried and
dual earning parents at negative income ranges, even though the latter two
families may have had to incur sizeable childcare costs just to earn income.
2.

Among Other Non-Parental Caregivers

'

Moving beyond the parenting of non-minor children, the TCJA curtailed
benefits for other caregivers at positive income ranges. The TCJA repealed
the personal exemption,' 60 which could benefit some taxpayers who cared for
non-minor children. In its place, it created a $500 Family Tax Credit that will
only partially compensate most taxpayers for the tax savings lost from that
repeal.' 6
This can be expected to affect dual earners and unmarried parents more
than sole earners. Because sole earners retain an available caregiver in the
home, they will have more flexibility to avoid financial strains than dual
earners and heads of household, who will often have to incur sizeable costs
to provide needed care while they are working outside the home. To make
matters worse, the value of the dependency care benefits, left unaltered by
the TCJA, will continue to erode over time providing minimal relief for the
high costs of hiring care providers.
And for members of the sandwich generation, who have both parental
and non-parental caregiving roles, these inequities compound. Given
stringent limits, these caregivers will have likely incurred childcare
expenditures that exceed statutory caps, so that they may receive no tax
benefits to reflect non-parental care costs. To this already grim situation,
some heads of household may also suffer from the TCJA's curtailment of the
beneficial rates that have historically applied to that status.
Turning to negative income ranges, those with non-parental care
obligations will find the Code as it was before the TCJA - completely
indifferent to their caregiving roles. Caregivers of, for instance, the elderly
will receive the same EITC as those with no dependents. Only care of non158 See I.R.C. § 1(a) (providing rates that do not depend on whether married couples
are
sole or dual earners); I.R.C. § 24 (providing credit that is same for all couples married filing
joint returns with same number of dependent children).
159 See supra text accompanying note 98.

160 See Amendment of 1986 Code (Tax Cuts and Jobs Act), supra note 1, at 2072-73.
161 I.R.C. § 24(h)(4).
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minor children ratchets up that credit. And likewise, these non-parental
caregivers will not be eligible for the ACTC, whose benefits are restricted to
parents. While of little comfort to families affected, Congress' favoritism of
sole earners is nothing new.
3.

Historical Context: Old Brine in New Bottles

-

-

Congress has historically been reluctant to make differentiations among
"parenting models" 6 2 and has preferred to tax similarly situated parents
i.e., parents caring for the same number of dependent children and earning
the same taxable income - homogenously. As a result, Congress has a long
history of favoring tax benefits for all parents over those that depend on what
parenting model is used.
Nor has this gone unnoticed in the legal tax scholarship. Writing in the
1980s, Professor Pamela Gann notes how "Congress' adoption in 1948 of the
criteria that 'equal income married couples pay equal taxes'1 63 has generally
led Congress to avoid enacting benefits specific to dual earners and
unmarried parents." Writing over a decade later, Professor McCaffery further
chronicles Congress's "conscious policy of taxing equal earning couples
equally"' 64 and its long "history of dealing with secondary earners, or more
accurately, not dealing with them." 65
Thus, the TCJA only added to an already well-established pattern
expanding benefits for all parents (through the doubled the CTC) while
ignoring or curtailing specific benefits for dual earners and heads of
household. But while Congress's favoritism of sole earners is, in many ways,
just "old brine in new bottles," it is important that future scholarship assess
the consequences of applying a preferentialism borne in an era when sole
earners predominated to a current society in which caregiving models are far
more diverse.
The remainder of this article sketches a few questions that should be
explored in the future work.
B. Questionsfor Future Work

1.

Old Preferentialism, Changed Demographics

America is no longer a nation of sole earners. Indeed, for some races,
ethnicities and economic classes, it really never was. In the 1960s the sole
earner model clearly predominated the overall population.' 6 6 However, even

162 See Gann, supranote 8 at 471 ("Congress' adoption in 1948 of [...] criteria that 'equal
income married couples pay equal taxes' reflected a system designed for a society largely
composed of one-worker married couples.").
163

Id.

164 EDWARD MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 23 (1997).
165

Id. at 69.

166 CENSUS BUREAU, FAMILIES
PRESENT,

BY PRESENCE OF OWN
TABLE

CHILDREN UNDER AGE

18:1950 TO
CH-1,
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at that time, black families typically utilized the dual earner model, often
requiring two incomes to make ends meet.1 67 But by the 1980s the dual earner
model was more common than the sole earner model overall, and this remains
true today.1 68 And just as the dual earner model has increased in prevalence,
it has also become increasingly common for children to be raised by
unmarried parents. `9
As a result, Congress's favoritism of the sole earner model had different
effects in 1960 than it has today. In the 1960s, Congress's preferentialism
benefitted the many at the expense of the few. Today, however,
demographics have shifted so that this partiality benefits the few at the
expense of the many.
Additionally, the inequities that result from Congress's favoritism of sole
earners may disparately affect certain demographics. For instance, in 2016,
among demographic groups studied, the Census Bureau found that it was
most common for black children to be raised by unmarried parents and least
common for Asian children. Falling in the statistical middle, about 30% of
white children and about 40% of Hispanic children were raised by unmarried
parents in 2016.170 And summarizing the March 2017 Census Data, Pew
Research reported that 47% of all black children were being raised by a solo
mother, compared to 23% of Hispanic children, 13% of white children, and
7% Asian children. 171
In short, while the Code's favoritism for sole earners may not be new,
shifting demographics have certainly changed the composition of the
winning and losing groups. This article certainly will not undertake a

https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/visualizations/timeseries/demo/families-and-households/ch-1.pdf (showing percentage of children raised by
married parents over time); see also, Parenting in America, PEw RESEARCH CTR 15 (2015),
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/12/17/1-the-american-family-today/
("In 1960, the
height of the post-World War II baby boom, there was one dominant family form. At that time
73% of all children were living in a family with two married parents in their first marriage.").
167 See, e.g., Allyson Sherman Grossman, Working Mothers and Their Children,Special
LaborForce Reports-Summaries 51, https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1981/05/rpt3fuill.pdf.
168 See Scott A. Hodge & Andrew Lundeen, America Has Become a Nation of DualIncome
Working
Couples,
TAX
FOUND.
(Nov.
21,
2013),
http://taxfoundation.org/blog/america-has-become-nation-dual-income-working-couples
(providing graph showing over 50% of married couples were dual earners since 1980); see
also The Rise in Dual Income Households, PEw RESEARCH CTR. (June 18, 2015),

https://www.pewresearch.org/ftdual-income-households-1 960-2012-2/.
169 Emily Badger, The UnbelievableRise ofSingle Motherhood in America Over the Last
Years,
WASH.
POST:
WONKBLOG
(Dec.
18,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/12/18/the-unbelievable-rise-ofsingle-motherhood-in-america-over-the-last-50-years/.
170 See generallyU.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN UNDER 18

50

YEARS AND MARITAL STATUS OF PARENTS, BY AGE, SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN AND
SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHILD FOR ALL CHILDREN: 2016, Table C3 (Nov. 2016),

https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/demo/tables/families/2016/cps-2016/tabc3-

all.xls.
171 Gretchen Livingston, About One-Third of U.S. Children are Living with an
Unmarried Parent, PEw RES. CTR. (April 27, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/04/27/about-one-third-of-u-s-children-are-living-with-an-unmarried-parent/.
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comprehensive discussion of how the Code's preference for the sole earner
model affects different demographic groups, but it provides fertile ground for
undertaking this study in future work.
2.

Old Preferentialism, Underappreciated Dangers

The Code's favoritism of the sole earner model is also likely to create
underappreciated dangers for dual earners and unmarried caregivers,
particularly when they have both parental and non-parental responsibilities.
As discussed, several demographic trends suggest that the ranks of the
sandwich generation - i.e., those that are both caring for minor children and
aging relatives - can be expected to increase considerably. The Baby
Boomers are reaching their senior years and life expectancies are far longer
than they once were.1 72 Experts have estimated that over half of Americans
that turned age 65 before 2016 would eventually need long-term care.1 73
As discussed, however, the inequities that result from the Code's
favoritism of sole earners can compound for members of the sandwich
generation. Unmarried and dual earning parents that take on care of elderly
relatives are unlikely to receive dependency care benefits to reflect eldercare
costs, because childcare costs will have already "used up" their limits. And
because head of household benefits do not ratchet up as number of
dependents increase, unmarried parents will not receive additional benefits
from that status when they take up additional caregiving roles. As also
discussed, those with negative incomes receive no tax benefits to reflect care
of non-minor children.
In addition to violating notions of fairness, this favoritism may create
particular dangers for dual earner and unmarried families. First, the Code
may be contributing to (rather than seeking to prevent) the risks of caregivers
facing financial collapse. In their book, The Two Income Trap, then legal
scholar Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi presented data
illustrating that dual earner families were far more likely to declare
bankruptcy than sole earners, and that unmarried families were even more in
danger of financial collapse. 174 Warren and Tyagi also identified a myriad of
reasons why this is so. High among them was that sole earners retain a stayat-home partner that can act as a "safety net" if calamity strikes. '5 If a parent

172 DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 103, at 9 ("The first Baby Boomers reached the
age of 65 in 2011, and roughly 10,000 Boomers continue to hit that milestone every day.");
see also, Ferrante, supra note 103, at 95 ("Several demographic trends are putting caregiving
pressure on middle-aged adults. Americans are experiencing longer life expectancies reaching
just over 78 years old on average. Due to advancements in medical science, technology, and
healthcare we have the oldest aging society in the history of the world.").
173 OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND DISABILITY, Dept. of Health
and

Human

Services, LONG-TERM SERVICES AND SUPPORT FOR OLDER AMERICANS: RISKS AND

FINANCING
(rev.
Feb.
2016),
available
at
https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/10621 1/ElderLTCrb-rev.pdf.
174 WARREN & TYAGI, THE TWO INCOME TRAP WHY MIDDLE-CLASS PARENTS ARE (STILL)
GOING BROKE 83, 105 (Basic Books 2004).
175 Id at 58.
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or child falls unexpectedly ill, the non-wage earner can provide needed care;
and if more income is needed to do so, that partner can enter the workforce
for a time. Dual earners and unmarried parents lack this safety net. If children
or family members fall ill, there is no one available to provide care or enter
the workforce temporarily to help them "get by."1 7 6
In addition to being unresponsive to and even exacerbating dangers of
financial bankruptcy, the Code's favoritism of sole earners may also increase
the risk that some individuals will not receive care when they ideally should.
Suppose that elderly Ernie is starting to show signs of mental and/or physical
incapacity, but, as often happens among the aging, his symptoms ebb and
flow. Some days Ernie seems relatively fine, whereas other days he has
trouble with routine tasks. While Ernie has not received a formal medical
diagnosis, his family members are increasingly concerned.
If Ernie's family members are sole earners, they will have the
opportunity to monitor Ernie in a consistent way to make sure he is safe and
assess his functioning. If, however, Ernie's family members are unmarried
parents or a dual earning couple, there options will be far more limited. They
cannot take care of Ernie themselves while they are working. Should they
hire a care provider to do so even though on some days he seems entirely
himself? Because this type of care is expensive, these families may struggle
to determine if this financial commitment is worthwhile, given the uncertain
nature of Ernie's condition. The Code's failure to provide tax savings to
reflect this care may make it more unlikely that individuals like Ernie will
receive care in these "marginal situations" - i.e., in situations in which it is
not yet clear whether and to what extent personal care is needed for a
particular individual and families are deciding whether to provide it.
This sketches only two of the possible dangers that might result from
Congress's favoritism of the sole earner model. In addition to fully exploring
the demographic inequities that result from Congress's habitual favoritism of
sole earners (discussed in the previous part), future work should tie the tax
inequities described in this article with data about how caregiving models
might increase the likelihood of bankruptcy and decrease the likelihood that
"marginally" ill individuals receive care.
This article concludes by making a more general point about how legal
tax scholarship can meaningfully contribute to discussions concerning the
taxation of caregivers and Congress's long-held favoritism for the sole earner
model. In order to move beyond specious political rhetoric and engage in
more fulsome debates, legal tax scholars should consider the theoretical basis
for differentiating among caregivers more deeply than they currently have.
V. CONCLUSION

This article has shown that the TCJA favored sole earning caregivers
over dual earning and unmarried caregivers by failing to address old
inequities and creating new ones of its own. It is upon these inequities that

176 Id. at 8-12.
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the legal tax scholarship has often focused, and understandably so. But while
inequities may offend colloquial notions of fairness, unequal taxation alone
is not per se problematic - the Code plays favorites all the time, providing
a bevy of benefits that are meant to incentivize certain behaviors and
stimulate economic activity.
It is, therefore, not enough to identify ways in which the Code taxes
different caregivers unequally. Instead, legal tax scholars must be able to
explain whether and why this differential treatment is inappropriate. To do
so, legal tax scholars should more deeply engage with distributive theories
that offer frameworks for assessing whether inequalities should be tolerated
and which identify higher order goals that justify unequal treatment.
Outside the context of caregiving, there has been plentiful and influential
work tying tax policies with distributive theories. Very commonly, legal tax
scholarship had invoked utilitarianism to analyze the ideal design of a
particular tax law. For utilitarians, the ideal tax law would maximize
aggregate utility (e.g., happiness), and unequal taxation would be justified if
it accomplished this goal. But legal tax scholarship has not gone very far to
connect ideas about caregivers with utilitarianism, or the many other
distributive theories that have been developed and utilized in both the legal
and non-legal literature. Companion work will, therefore, begin to build these
bridges and, it is fervently hoped, bring new voices into the debate about how
we should tax caregivers.7"?

177 Shannon Weeks McCormack, Taxing Parents: Welfarist Bridges (2020)
(full draft on
file with Author); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Taxing Parents: Resource and Luck
Egalitarianism (2020) (draft in progress); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Taxing Parents:
Welfarism and Other-Regarding Preferences (2020) (draft in progress); Shannon Weeks
McCormack, Taxing Parents:Equality of OpportunityApproaches (2020) (draft in progress);
Shannon Weeks McCormack, Taxing Parents:A New TheoreticalApproach (2020) (draft in
progress).

